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a b s t r a c t 
This paper investigates the short term effects of a large scale intervention, funded by the 
European Social Fund, which provides additional instruction time to selected classes of 
lower secondary schools in Southern Italy. Selection is addressed using institutional rules 
that regulate class formation: ﬁrst year students are divided into groups distinguished by 
letters, they remain in the same group across grades at the school, and the composition 
of teachers assigned to groups is stable over time. Using a difference-in-differences strat- 
egy, we consider consecutive cohorts of ﬁrst year students enrolled in the same group. We 
compare participating groups to non-participating groups within the same school, as well 
as to groups in non-participating schools. We ﬁnd that the intervention raised scores in 
mathematics for students from the least advantaged backgrounds. We also ﬁnd that tar- 
geting the best students with extra activities in language comes at the cost of lowering 
performance in mathematics. We go beyond average effects, ﬁnding that the positive ef- 
fect for mathematics is driven by larger effects for the best students. 
© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license. 
( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ) 
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(. Introduction 
Understanding the key drivers of quality in education
lays a fundamental role to meet the EU “Education and
raining 2020” targets. The relevance of this problem for
olicy making is particularly important in areas facing The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and should 
ot be attributed to the European Commission. 
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 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ) arked socio-economic deprivation. Given the conspic-
ous investments made to ﬁnance structural assistance,
roviding evidence on the key dimensions that should be
argeted by public interventions in Europe adds to the
iscussion on the most effective growth strategies for the
oming decades. 
This paper focuses on education policies that mandate
ow achieving students to extra hours at school. We exploit
ariation in instruction time resulting from an interven-
ion implemented in selected regions of Southern Italy el-
gible for EU Regional Development Funds (Objective 1 re-
ions) and EU Social Funds. The Quality and Merit Project
PQM in what follows) started in 2010 and targets low
chieving lower secondary schools of these regions (froms article under the CC BY-NC-ND license. 
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 ixth to eighth grade). 1 The rationale for intervening stems
rom the fact that schools of these areas are characterised
y markedly lower student performance if compared to
chools in the rest of the country. 
Participation of schools is not mandatory. Applicant
chools are ranked using performance indicators (i.e. per-
entage of repeating and failing students and dropout
ates), and only those at the bottom end of the perfor-
ance distribution are eventually enrolled. Schools ad-
itted to the programme must organise education activ-
ties outside regular school hours in a selected number
f classes chosen by school principals at the time of ap-
lication. Teachers involved in afternoon activities must
e tenured and with a full-time contract, and teach the
ame students during normal school hours. Activities vary
cross students, ranging from remedial classes to study
rogrammes aimed at mastering advanced skills. All stu-
ents in the class participate in at least one of these activ-
ties. Extra time is organised as individualised instruction
n small study groups, and all costs are covered through
U funds. 
The intervention we consider shifts public spending
or the classes involved above the OECD average, and is
orth a 7% increase of current per-student ﬁgures in Italy
9100USD, as opposed to 9300USD in OECD countries). We
se longitudinal information on test scores for two consec-
tive cohorts of students in PQM schools before and after
010, and in similar schools located in Objective 1 areas
ut not enrolled in PQM. We use standardised scores for
ixth graders at the national level, which we link to admin-
strative information on participating schools to investigate
he (short term) effects on learning. Given the lack of stan-
ardised scores at the national level before the school year
009/10, our paper is the ﬁrst to provide a rigorous eval-
ation of the effect of the EU funds spent on education in
taly on a large scale. 
We address selection of participating classes using fea-
ures of the Italian school system. First year students are
ivided into groups, called sezione , and remain in the same
roup for the whole cycle of studies. 2 Assignment of stu-
ents to groups is not random. The key feature that we
xploit for identiﬁcation is that teachers are typically as-
igned to the same sezione over school years and across
rades. The adoption of this practice is prompted by a
eform that was implemented nationwide in 2009 (be-
ore the intervention we consider) to regulate staff ratios.
or example, the law states that math teachers must ful-1 The project is funded through PON Istruzione 2007–2013 (A-2-FSE- 
009-2). The four targeted regions are Apulia, Calabria, Campania and 
icily. 
2 Normal age for enrolment in lower secondary education is 10, and 
rogression to the upper secondary level – which is compulsory by the 
talian law – is expected three years later. To give an example of how 
he sezione mechanism works, consider a school composed of 6 classes: 2 
th grade classes, 2 7th grade classes and 2 8th grade classes. This school 
ill have 2 sezione , which we call A and B. Hence, in each year there will 
e sezione A class and sezione B class of 6th graders; sezione A class and 
ezione B class of 7th graders; and sezione A class and sezione B class of 
th graders. A student assigned to sezione A class in 6th grade in year 1, 
ill be, with the same peers, in sezione A class in 7th grade in year 2, 
nd so on. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ﬁl their weekly duties (18 h in total) by teaching mod-
ules of 6 h to three different classes, and explicitly sug-
gests that these should be the sixth, seventh and eighth
grades of the same sezione to ensure continuity of teach-
ing practices. We consider a difference-in-differences strat-
egy, and compare changes in test scores for consecutive co-
horts of students enrolled in the same sezione before and
after PQM. As teachers employed in a sezione are the same
across cohorts, our approach controls for teacher unobserv-
ables which are likely drivers of selection into the inter-
vention. We check the sensitivity of our results to the pres-
ence of pre-intervention trends in test scores using data for
ﬁfth graders. Despite some data limitations that are dis-
cussed below, we are not able to reject the validity of our
difference-in-differences strategy. 
We exploit within school variability in class partici-
pation to study effects on students not directly involved
in PQM. We are particularly concerned with possible in-
teractions between teachers of participating classes and
other teachers at the school, as the former must attend
a preparatory course before organising afternoon activi-
ties. We assess the existence of indirect effects by compar-
ing students in non-participating classes of PQM schools
to students in non-participating schools located in Objec-
tive 1 area. In addition, we study heterogeneity in the ef-
fects of instruction time along two different dimensions.
We let returns depend on number of school hours on
top of normal instruction time, thus studying a dose-
response model rather than the coeﬃcient on a participa-
tion dummy. Moreover, we go beyond average effects and
investigate the returns to participation on quantiles of the
score distribution. This choice is motivated by the size-
able heterogeneity in returns that was documented in past
work in the literature. 
Our results can be summarised as follows. First, we ﬁnd
that PQM has had a positive effect on average test scores
in mathematics but not in language. This effect is driven by
large returns for students of schools in the lowest tertile
of pre-intervention achievement. These are learning envi-
ronments characterised by students from markedly less ad-
vantaged backgrounds. 
Second, for schools in the top tertile of pre-intervention
achievement we ﬁnd that extra hours tailored around
reading activities have a negative effect on scores in math-
ematics, and no effect on language. This result is robust
to a series of sensitivity checks that we perform in the
data. Given that language abilities are found to be less re-
sponsive to PQM across learning environments, we con-
clude that in the least problematic environments instruc-
tion time should target activities that enhance mathemati-
cal abilities, as that the additional time spent at school en-
gaged in language activities may substitute the time that
students would have invested on mathematics. 
Third, we ﬁnd that PQM has increased inequality within
the class. The counterfactual distributions of math scores
(i.e., scores with and without PQM) differ only after the
median. This implies that average effects of PQM are
driven by a sharp change in the upper part of the score
distribution within the class. Moreover, we ﬁnd that the
negative effect of language activities on mathematics for
schools in the top tertile is concentrated at the top end
E. Battistin, E.C. Meroni / Economics of Education Review 55 (2016) 39–56 41 
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u  f the test score distribution. In other words, extra time
n language activities may come at the cost of outstanding
erformance in mathematics. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows.
ection 2 reviews the empirical literature on the effects of
nstruction time on academic achievement; in Section 3 we
escribe the intervention and provide some background in-
ormation. Data are described in Section 4 . Section 5 ex-
lains the sample selection criteria employed, and dis-
usses descriptives statistics. In Section 6 we explain the
ethodology used, distinguishing between average and 
on-linear (quantile) effects. Results and sensitivity checks 
re presented in Sections 7 and 8 , respectively, while
ection 9 concludes by providing some policy recommen-
ations. 
. Related literature 
The rationale for increasing instruction time builds 
pon the direct effects of education on learning, and the
ide-beneﬁts of lowered risk of negative behaviour for dis-
dvantaged students. The empirical literature has adopted 
lternative strategies to assess the causal effect of instruc-
ion time on scores. A ﬁrst strategy exploits between or
ithin country variability in the exposure to school sub-
ects. Small effects are documented in elementary and
ower secondary schools by Lee and Barro (2001) using
 panel of 59 countries, and by Wößmann (2003) us-
ng TIMMS data, in high schools by Lavy (2010) using
ISA data. Rivkin and Schiman (2015) also use PISA data,
nd ﬁnd that increased instruction time is more effective
n better classroom environments. Mandel and Süssmuth 
2011) exploit variation in instruction time across states 
n Germany and document positive effects on PISA text
cores. 
A second strategy exploits variation in length of school
ear resulting from quasi-experimental settings. Posi- 
ive results for elementary and lower secondary schools 
tudents are documented in several studies: Marcotte 
2007) and Marcotte and Hemelt (2008) consider number
f school-closing days for snowfalls in Maryland, ﬁnding
hat students perform better in years with less unsched-
led closing days. Hansen (2008) exploit weather-related 
ancellations in Colorado and Maryland, and changes in
est-date administration in Minnesota. The results point to 
ositive effects of the number of school days on student
erformance. Sims (2008) uses a similar idea exploiting a
eform in Wisconsin, ﬁnding that increased time at school
ffects test scores in mathematics. Pischke (2007) exploits
ariation in instruction time resulting from the German
short school years”, ﬁnding that shorter years are asso-
iated with higher grade repetition. Aucejo and Romano
2014) study the relative effectiveness of reducing ab-
enteeism at school vis- `a -vis extending the school cal-
ndar. Their ﬁndings indicate that the former strategy is
ost effective, in particular for low performing students. 
imilar effects are found for high school students, Bellei
2009) ﬁnds that the Chilean full school day programme
as been beneﬁcial for both reading and mathematics test
cores, and Kikuchi (2014) exploits the revision of the
apanese curriculum standards in 1981 and shows that a3% reduction of instruction time caused a 5% reduction in
chooling and a 34% reduction in high school enrolment
or women. Parinduri (2014) studies the effect of a reform
mplemented in all grades in Indonesia, which changed the
tart of school year from January to July. He ﬁnds that the
onger school year decreases the probability of grade rep-
tition and increases educational attainment, and it also
ncreases the probability of working in formal sectors and
ages later in life, especially for children living in rural ar-
as. 
A different strand of literature, which is closer in spirit
o the intervention considered here, investigates the ef-
ects of increased school time conceived as “more hours
er day” rather than “more days per year”. Extra-education
s organised by opening schools for longer hours dur-
ng the afternoon, either providing extra instruction time
n curricular activities or helping students from less ad-
antage backgrounds doing their homework. Lavy and
chlosser (2005) consider a programme in Israeli high
chools and document an increase in college matriculation
ates of about 3% points. Jensen (2013) exploits a policy
n Denmark that increased classroom hours in literacy and
athematics and documents very large returns in math-
matics for 9th graders. Zimmer, Hamilton, and Christina
2010) considers Pittsburgh Public Schools and document
ositive effects for mathematics in both middle and ele-
entary schools. Lavy (2012) exploits a policy experiment
n Israeli elementary schools that changed the length of
he school week and the time allocation to core subjects.
e ﬁnds that more time at school on key tasks improves
erformance in mathematics, English and sciences, espe-
ially for students from low socio-economic backgrounds.
n the contrary, Meyer and Van Klaveren (2013) ﬁnd no
igniﬁcant effect on math or language achievement using
ata for Dutch elementary schools. Full school day com-
ared to half school day was found to have a positive effect
n learning outcomes also in kindergarten ( DeCicca, 2007;
ibbs, 2010; Lash, Bae, Barrat, Burr, & Fong, 2008; Robin,
rede, & Barnett, 2006 ). 
The literature on the effects of increased instruction
ime on academic performance overlaps, to a large extent,
ith that considering the effects of speciﬁc remedial pro-
rammes. Often students beneﬁting from increased time at
chool are from less advantaged backgrounds, and extra ac-
ivities at school come in the form of remedial classes. The
ntervention considered here shares with remedial educa-
ion programmes the idea that public investment should
arget schools at the lower end of the performance distri-
ution. However, rather than targeting low achieving stu-
ents in the school, PQM targets all students of low per-
orming schools in the most deprived areas of the coun-
ry. Positive effects of remedial education programmes are
ocumented in Aiken, West, Schwalm, Carroll and Hsi-
ng (1998) , Calcagno and Long (2008) , Bettinger and Long
2009) and De Paola and Scoppa (2014) for university
tudents; in Lang et al. (2009) and Lavy and Schlosser
2005) for high school students. The experimental evalu-
tion in Grossman and Sipe (1992) of a summer school
rogramme aimed at contrasting early school dropouts
nds no effects. Banerjee, Cole, Duﬂo, and Linden (2007) ,
sing experimental data, study a programme providing
42 E. Battistin, E.C. Meroni / Economics of Education Review 55 (2016) 39–56 
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 emedial education to third and fourth graders in India.
he intervention targets low achieving students in the
reated schools, and offers remedial classes to small group
f students during regular school time. They ﬁnd an effect
n test scores of about 0.40 points of standard deviations
or children with the lowest pre-programme performance. 
. Background information on the intervention 
Systematic evidence from international surveys (IEA
IMMS 2007; PISA 2003, 2006 and 2009) has identiﬁed
 gap between Italy and other OECD countries. It is now
ell documented that Italian students perform below the
uropean average in both mathematics and reading. This
gure conceals a good deal of variability across regions,
ith Northern areas performing in line with other Euro-
ean countries and Southern areas performing markedly
elow. The recent experience on national assessment tests
n Italy has demonstrated that, while the North/South di-
ide is contained for second graders, it increases at the
nd of the primary school and grows even larger in middle
chools ( INVALSI, 2011 ). With the aim of boosting learn-
ng in lower and upper secondary schools, four regions lo-
ated in the Objective 1 area (Campania, Sicily, Calabria
nd Apulia) became eligible for the EU Regional Devel-
pment Funds and the European Social Fund for the pe-
iod 2007–2013. PQM was one of the interventions funded
hrough these resources. 3 
PQM targets public lower secondary schools in Objective
 regions. It was ﬁrst implemented in the year 2009/10, ﬁ-
ancing only additional instruction time in mathematics in
15 schools. In the following year new schools were added
long with the possibility of extending instruction time to
anguage. The total number of schools involved in the year
010/11 was 223, 84 of which already participated in the
rst year. In either round, participation of schools was not
andatory. Applicant schools were enrolled giving prefer-
nce to those under-performing with respect to percent-
ge of repeating and failing students and dropout rates. 4 
on-random selection of schools, classes and, eventually,
f intensity of afternoon activities are the three layers of
otential bias challenging the empirical analysis. 
Schools apply for PQM in June, and are notiﬁed with
cceptance by the end of August. Families of children who
ill start sixth grade in September apply for school admis-
ion in February of the previous year, thus we can safely
ssume that prospective participation in PQM plays no role
n parental choices regarding school enrolment. In addi-
ion mobility across schools – both before and after the
chool year has started – is limited because of administra-3 To the best of our knowledge, the only available evidence on the ef- 
ects of the EU funds in Italy is Falzetti, Palmerio, Romano, and Vidoni 
2012) . By focusing on schools sampled in both the 2006 and the 2009 
ISA waves, they ﬁnd that schools in areas eligible to receive EU funds 
mproved their test scores from 2006 to 2009 compared to schools be- 
onging to regions of Southern Italy that are not eligible. 
4 We were not granted access to the list of applicant schools; because 
f this, our identiﬁcation strategy cannot rely on exclusion restrictions de- 
ned using applicants denied participation in the programme. We know 
owever that the pool of applicant schools that were eventually denied 
articipation in 2010/11 is less than 15% (about 20 schools). 
 
 
 
 
 
 tive burdens and little negotiation power with the school.
The transfer must be authorised by both principals at the
schools of origin and destination; moreover, it must be
motivated by objective reasons, usually a change of resi-
dence of the entire family. Importantly, participation of the
school in PQM is communicated in September, not neces-
sarily before class formation. We believe that hardly par-
ents would change school because of PQM a few days be-
fore the academic year starts. 
PQM schools must organise extra activities outside reg-
ular hours in a selected number of classes, two per sub-
ject. The school principal must name two teachers who
will provide extra education at the time of application. If
the school is enrolled in PQM, the choice made on teach-
ers is strictly enforced. As participation in PQM should last
for the three grades of lower secondary education, eligible
teachers are solely those who with a permanent position
and are expected to remain at the school for the full du-
ration of the programme (ruling out, for example, teach-
ers who are about to retire, or those employed with con-
tracts with high turnover). Most likely these are teachers
employed in the same sezione over time, and whose work-
loads at school are fulﬁlled in the sixth, seventh and eighth
grade of the same sezione every year. Mobility of perma-
nent staff is not necessarily zero, of course, but the cum-
bersome process required to transfer to a new school puts
us on the safe side. The application for a transfer is ﬁled by
February and, if successful, is approved by June. Therefore
we can safely assume that names of permanent teachers
wishing to transfer are in the information set of principals
at the time of application for PMQ. The salary offered to
teachers for their extra loads is low (roughly 25 euro net
per hour of activity), and excludes the time required to un-
dertake training and the preparation of teaching materials.
Because of this, we believe that PQM does not represent a
strong monetary incentive to participation. 
Participating teachers are mandated to a course that
lasts 60 h (30 of which are on-line), held during the
ﬁrst part of the academic year (October- December). The
course does not target general competencies or knowledge
of school subjects, but provides guidance on the organisa-
tion of afternoon activities, which are offered in the sec-
ond part of the academic year (January–May). The course
is held in groups of 10 teachers, and supervised by a men-
tor who provides support for the organisation of extra ac-
tivities. Teachers are asked to draft an improvement plan
based on a standardised test which student of participat-
ing classes take at the beginning of the academic year (end
of September). The test should help teachers target pupils
who are in need and the areas of intervention and in de-
ciding how many and which kind of activities organise
– remedial or advanced activities aimed at consolidating
knowledge acquired during normal school hours. 5 
According to the programme regulation, the number of
afternoon activities planned per class can vary between
1 and 8 and is agreed between principal and teachers
once the students take the test, thus not at the time of5 We were not granted access to this test, and we cannot distinguish 
who in the class is beneﬁtting from remedial or advanced activities. 
E. Battistin, E.C. Meroni / Economics of Education Review 55 (2016) 39–56 43 
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 pplication. Each activity consists of 15 h of extra edu-
ation to be held outside the regular school time to stu-
ents, and the teacher can decide on intensity of exposure
o these activities, as well as on contents (remedial educa-
ion or advanced course). As a result, students receive an
ndividualised education plan. In most classes the number
f activities chosen by the teacher is between 2 and 4. Un-
ortunately we do not know to which activities students
re assigned. However, qualitative information on the func- 
ioning of PQM suggests that the principle of equal par-
icipation to activities of all students in the class was the
ule, rather than the exception. In other words, all students
n PQM classes spent additional time at school. Because of
his, our analysis is aimed at understanding the effects on
cores of lengthening school hours. 6 
. Data 
School level data are provided by the Italian Ministry
f Education through the INVALSI ( National Institute for the
valuation of the Educational System ), and contain general
nformation on characteristics (e.g. number of students, 
tudent to teacher ratio and dropout rates) and the exact
unicipality where the school is located. Through this in-
ormation, geographical and demographic characteristics of 
he environment where the schools operate are also avail-
ble. 
Starting from the school year 2009/10, sixth grade stu-
ents in Italy sit standardised tests under the supervision
f the INVALSI. Participation of schools to the national test
s compulsory by law. Students are tested in both math-
matics and Italian language, and information is collected 
n socio-demographic characteristics (gender, year of birth, 
rigin, level of education and employment status of the
arents, household composition) as well as motivation and
erception of the school. 
Adopting the same international standards in IEA- 
IMMS and PISA, INVALSI tests are designed to mea-
ure complementary dimensions of learning. Mathematics 
s assessed considering two cognitive domains: knowledge 
which refers to the student’s knowledge of facts, con-
epts, tools, and procedures in mathematics), and reason- 
ng (which focuses on the student’s ability to apply knowl-
dge and conceptual understanding in a problem situa- 
ion). Similarly, the test for language is designed to mea-
ure reading proﬁciency (i.e. the ability to understand and
nterpret a text) and grammatical knowledge. We distin-
uish between outcomes that refer to Italian language
comprising reading comprehension and grammatical knowl- 6 We focus on scores rather than on drop-out or failure rates, for two 
easons: ﬁrst, the population under study (sixth graders) has not yet 
eached the minimum age for leaving school (16 years). The most recent 
gures for drop-out rates at lower secondary school in the regions con- 
idered are all below 0.5% and our data, students aged 15 or more are 
.3%. Since school attendance is enforced by law until age 16, we do not 
hink that dropout rates are important here. Second, failure rates would 
e interesting to consider, but unfortunately we do not have this kind of 
nformation. Indeed the test are taken roughly a month before the end of 
he school year and the data refer to this point in time, therefore we do 
ot know whether the children subsequently failed or were passed to the 
ext grade. 
t  
p  
b  
s  
w  
p  
y
d
s
ldge ) and mathematics (comprising mathematical knowl-
dge and mathematical reasoning ). Scores used in the analy-
is represent the number of correct answers, and are stan-
ardised to have zero mean and unit variance by school
ear. 
Past work has documented pervasive score manipula-
ion in Southern regions of the country – see, for exam-
le, Angrist, Battistin, and Vuri (2014) . These papers have
ooked at data for primary schools, where manipulation is
cknowledged by the INVALSI and documented in their of-
cial publications. For lower secondary schools, however,
he available documentation from INVALSI suggests that
anipulation is less of a problem in the school grade and
ears considered in the analysis ( INVALSI, 2010; 2011 ). Re-
ults from our analysis are unaffected if we control for
randomly assigned) external monitors in the school on the
est day, as in Angrist et al. (2014) . 
It is ﬁnally worth being explicit about the sources of
ariability in the data used in what follows. Class is used
o denote a group of students who are taught together at
chool. Cohorts are indexed to year of enrolment at school.
very cohort of students is divided into multiple classes
t enrolment using Maimonides-like rules ( Angrist et al.,
014 ). Classes are labelled with letters (e.g. A, B and C),
nd these denote sezione as we explained in the Intro-
uction. The two relevant dimensions used to deﬁne our
ifference-in-differences com parisons are cohort of enrol-
ent (2009 and 2010) and sezione in the school. 
. Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
.1. Sample selection criteria 
We consider only the second wave of PQM, which was
mplemented in the year 2010/11. This choice is very prag-
atic, and driven by the availability of standardised scores
n Italy only from 2009/10. Our main sample selection
onsists in keeping only schools participating in PQM for
he ﬁrst time in the year 2010/11. Compared to all re-
aining schools on Objective 1 areas, PQM schools have
ore students, larger teacher-student ratios, more perma-
ent teachers, and have applied for external funding in the
ast. However, past performance does not seem to be the
ain driver of school selection. The percentage of correct
nswers at the 2009/10 national test is 47.9 and 57.2 in
QM schools for math and language, respectively, while the
orresponding ﬁgures in eligible regions are 48.2 and 57.2,
espectively. 
To contain differences due to voluntary participa-
ion, we preliminary matched PQM schools to non-
articipant schools with respect characteristics measured
efore 2010/11. We set out a matched pair comparison of
imilar schools located in the same province. Matching
as implemented with replacement using region-speciﬁc
ropensity scores. 7 The working sample that resulted from7 The matching procedure along the dimensions considered did not 
ield common support problems (only 4 PQM schools out of 138 were 
ropped because of this). Variables used for the calculation of the propen- 
ity score are: average percentage of correct answers in mathematics and 
anguage in sixth grade; student-teacher ratio, proportion of permanent 
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Table 1 
Sample size (schools, classes and students). 
Pre treatment year Post treatment year 
Schools Enrolled in PQM 134 134 
Used as control 114 114 
Classes Enrolled in PQM 313 313 
Used as controls in PQM schools 407 407 
Used as controls in remaining schools 595 595 
Students Enrolled in PQM 6228 6461 
Used as controls in PQM schools 8260 8380 
Used as controls in remaining schools 12,455 12,672 
Note: Presented are number of students, classes and schools in the working sample (see Section 5.1 
for details). 
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Table 2 
Descriptives at the school level of PQM and control schools. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
PQM Control Difference Score 
% of correct answers in 
mathematics, sixth grade 
0.479 0.490 −0 .010 1 .367 
(0 .010) (3 .045) 
% of correct answers in 
language, sixth grade 
0.572 0.585 −0 .014 −5 .041 
(0 .007) (3 .860) 
Proportion of teachers with 
permanent contract 
0.892 0.904 −0 .012 −0 .261 
(0 .012) (1 .609) 
Student to teacher ratio 9.632 9.931 −0 .299 −0 .097 
(0 .275) (0 .100) 
Number of students 402.8 398.4 4 .470 0 .001 
(26 .34) (0 .001) 
Proportion of foreign 
students 
0.027 0.027 0 .0 0 0 1 .379 
(0 .003) (5 .129) 
Proportion of students with 
disabilities 
0.034 0.031 0 .003 2 .345 
(0 .003) (8 .652) 
Drop-out rate 0.003 0.003 0 .0 0 0 −5 .394 
(0 .001) (12 .208) 
Failure rate 0.049 0.046 0 .003 −3 .374 
(0 .006) (3 .832) 
Proportion of repeating 
students 
0.048 0.041 0 .007 3 .453 
(0 .006) (4 .130) 
Proportion of females in 
the school 
0.490 0.488 0 .002 0 .557 
(0 .007) (2 .395) 
Proportion of classes doing 
more than 30 h 
0.335 0.337 −0 .001 −0 .170 
(0 .051) (0 .401) 
School received PON funds 
for students’ activities 
0.963 0.974 −0 .011 −0 .239 
(0 .023) (0 .770) 
Municipality located on 
mountain 
0.284 0.246 0 .038 0 .179 
(0 .056) (0 .307) 
(Log) population in town, 
2009 
10.38 10.31 0 .069 0 .004 
(0 .192) (0 .111) 
Number of schools 134 114 
Note: Presented are descriptive statistics for schools in the working sam- his procedure is composed of 23 schools enrolled only in
QM mathematics, 37 schools enrolled only in PQM Ital-
an language, and 74 schools enrolled in both components
f PQM. This results in 127 classes receiving extra educa-
ion in mathematics, 146 in Italian language and 40 in both
ubjects. 
Using school identiﬁers provided by the INVALSI, we
inked data for the same school in the 2009/10 (pre-
rogramme) and the 2010/11 (post-programme) year. Im-
ortantly, we obtained identiﬁers for the group to which
tudents are assigned at school ( sezione ). Thus our working
ample consists of two consecutive cohorts of sixth graders
nrolled in the same school and in the same sezione one
ear before and one year after the introduction of PQM.
able 1 presents the number of PQM and control schools,
lasses and students in both pre and post intervention
ears. 8 
.2. School characteristics and test scores 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for PQM schools
nd for the schools chosen as controls in the working sam-
le, using only pre-programme data. The average of the
arious dimensions considered is similar – see columns
1) and (2) – and, in fact, not statistical different between
roups – see column (3). In column (4) we report the esti-
ates of a logistic regression for the probability of being a
QM school in the working sample. It follows that none of
he variables included is a good predictor for being a PQM
chool, and this corroborates the quality of the matching
rocedure implemented. 9 eachers, dropout rate, failing rate, proportion of repeating students, pro- 
ortion of immigrant students, proportion of disable students, propor- 
ion of female students, proportion of students attending more than 30 h 
er week, number of students, whether the school has received in the 
revious year other PON funds for other activities, population in town 
nd whether school is located on a mountain municipality. Only public 
chools were considered in the matching procedure. 
8 Fig. A-1 of Appendix A shows a map of the 4 regions involved and the 
ocation and number of PQM and control schools in each municipality. 
9 In Table A-1 of Appendix A we present descriptive statistics for stu- 
ent characteristics in the two groups of schools, that is for character- 
stics that were not directly used in the matching procedure. The table 
hows that there are minor differences between the two groups along 
ome dimensions (e.g. students in control schools have higher percent- 
ge of mothers employed and of highly educated parents), but the overall 
esults point to rather similar patterns. 
ple (pre-programme data only). Column (1): schools enrolled; column 
(2): control schools; column (3): difference between column (1) and col- 
umn (2) (standard error in parentheses); column (4): logit regression for 
being a PQM school (standard errors in parentheses). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Throughout our empirical exercise we will stratify
schools in the matched sample according to tertiles of
performance in mathematics in the pre-intervention year.
The aim is to cluster schools according to their socio-
economic background. A similar stratiﬁcation could be
obtained using test scores in Italian language, yielding
conclusions similar to those presented below. 10 Summary10 Main results obtained stratifying by Italian Language test score are 
reported in Table A-3 in Appendix A. 
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Table 3 
Descriptive statistics (schools by tertiles of 2009/10 performance in mathematics). 
Tertiles of test scores 
Bottom Middle Top 
Test score mathematics −0 .478 −0 .014 0 .439 
Test score language −0 .376 −0 .024 0 .282 
Proportion of teachers with permanent contract 0 .874 0 .892 0 .926 
Student to teacher ratio 9 .407 10 .143 9 .758 
Number of students 366 .7 427 .2 408 .4 
Proportion of females in the school 0 .487 0 .483 0 .498 
Proportion of foreign students 0 .029 0 .023 0 .029 
Proportion of students with disabilities 0 .040 0 .029 0 .029 
Drop-out rate 0 .006 0 .001 0 .002 
Failure rate 0 .064 0 .044 0 .035 
Proportion of repeating students 0 .066 0 .039 0 .030 
Class weekly hour 31 .70 31 .18 31 .91 
Class size 21 .84 22 .33 22 .35 
Proportion of students whose parents have low education 0 .534 0 .426 0 .350 
Proportion of students whose parents have medium education 0 .360 0 .409 0 .449 
Proportion of students whose parents have high education 0 .106 0 .165 0 .201 
Proportion of mothers employed 0 .338 0 .397 0 .432 
Proportion of students whose father’s occupation is : unemployed 0 .078 0 .061 0 .049 
Proportion of students whose father’s occupation is : blue collar 0 .337 0 .308 0 .274 
Proportion of students whose father’s occupation is : white collar 0 .432 0 .415 0 .429 
Proportion of students whose father’s occupation is : managerial 0 .153 0 .216 0 .249 
Proportion of students living with both parents 0 .890 0 .896 0 .903 
Average HOME scale coeﬃcient −0 .168 −0 .057 0 .048 
Number of schools 82 82 84 
Note: Presented are descriptive statistics for all schools in the working sample. Tertiles are deﬁned from the 
distribution of test scores in mathematics in year 2009/10 (see Section 5.2 for details). 
s  
t
e
n  
t
m  
t  
i  
e  
l
 
s  
a  
e  
p  
t  
l  
t  
f  
p  
p  
b  
s  
l  
t
f
n
p
o
w  
n
5
 
w  
o  
o  
d  
i  
t  
s  
t  
o  
7  
w  
i  
p  
f  
t  
a  
i  tatistics presented in Table 3 suggest that the stratiﬁca-
ion adopted indeed resembles division according to socio- 
conomic background. As for student characteristics, we 
otice that students attending schools in the bottom ter-
ile come from less-advantaged family backgrounds: less 
others are working, less fathers have a high occupa-
ional status, the proportion of parents with low education
s much higher, and the proportion of parents with high
ducation much lower; the index for home possession is
ower. 11 
Table 4 paves the way for our empirical analysis, as it
hows how test scores have changed over time in PQM
nd control schools. Descriptives are presented for math-
matics and language by tertile of performance in the pre-
rogramme year, the most problematic schools being in
he top panel. As expected, test scores are highly corre-
ated with the socio-economic background of students in
he school. As for mathematics, the change in test scores
or classes involved in PQM mathematics appears more
ronounced, with respect to control classes, in the most
roblematic schools. For schools in the bottom tertile num-
ers in the table picture positive or constant trends in test
cores from 2009/10 to 2010/11 for both mathematics and
anguage; for schools in middle tertile trends are mixed;11 The variables used to calculate this index are: child has a quiet place 
o study; child has a desk to do his homework; child as a single room 
or herself; number of books in the house; house has an internet con- 
ection; house has a burglar alarm; house has more than one bathroom; 
arents have more than one car. Higher values of the score denote better 
ff households. 
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egative trends. 
.3. Instruction time 
Exploiting variation in number of activities provided,
e can use hours spent by the class in afternoon activities
n school subject (mathematics or language) as indicator
f treatment intensity. In particular we considered a stan-
ardised version of this indicator, the per cent change in
nstruction time obtained using the total number of hours
hat are mandatory dedicated to the subject during regular
chool time. We computed this by knowing that each ac-
ivity lasts 15 h, and we know that children in lower sec-
ndary schools dedicate 4 h per week to mathematics and
 h per week to Italian language and that the number of
eeks in a school year are 33. Descriptives of the indicator
n the three groups of schools are provided in Table 5 . The
ercentage change in instruction time is on average higher
or mathematics than for language, and can be substantial:
he mean value is well above 35% for mathematics, and set
t about 25% for language (about 50 h of afternoon activ-
ties for both subjects). The proﬁle across school tertiles is
ump-shaped, with schools at the two ends of the distri-
ution of test scores presenting lower take up rates of ex-
ra activities. 
To shed light into the possible determinants of this
ariability, we regressed our indicator of intensity in year
010/11 on class inputs in year 2009/10, using observations
or the same sezione in both years. The results of this anal-
sis are fully documented in Table A-2 of Appendix A, and
oint to generally weak correlations of intensity with the
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Table 4 
Descriptive statistics (changes over time in test score). 
Mathematics Language 
Pre Post Change Pre Post Change 
Bottom tertile 
Control class in control schools −0 .526 −0 .459 0 .154 −0 .372 −0 .325 0 .134 
Control class in PQM schools −0 .474 −0 .359 0 .166 −0 .308 −0 .281 0 .079 
Any extra class in Language −0 .458 −0 .354 0 .103 −0 .355 −0 .296 0 .058 
Any extra class in Mathematics −0 .487 −0 .432 0 .419 −0 .068 −0 .217 0 .215 
Middle tertile 
Control class in control schools −0 .031 0 .036 0 .05 0 .019 0 .059 0 .023 
Control class in PQM schools −0 .045 −0 .016 −0 .039 −0 .083 −0 .058 −0 .042 
Any extra class in Language 0 .085 0 .002 −0 .112 −0 .026 0 .012 0 .010 
Any extra class in Mathematics −0 .017 −0 .120 0 .063 0 .046 −0 .025 0 .095 
Top tertile 
Control class in control schools 0 .373 0 .264 −0 .172 0 .201 0 .143 −0 .121 
Control class in PQM schools 0 .353 0 .271 −0 .175 0 .179 0 .101 −0 .169 
Any extra class in Language 0 .504 0 .32 −0 .269 0 .236 0 .293 −0 .027 
Any extra class in Mathematics 0 .400 0 .189 −0 .208 0 .192 0 .093 −0 .096 
Note: Reported are average test scores by group calculated for 2009/10 (pre-programme) and 2010/11 (post- 
programme) data. Reported also is the change over time of test scores. Test scores have been standardised to 
have zero mean and unit variance in each year and subject. Schools are grouped into tertiles deﬁned from the 
average test score in mathematics in year 2009/10 (see Section 5.2 for details). 
Table 5 
Descriptive statistics (exposure to afternoon activities). 
Bottom tertile Middle tertile Top Tertile 
Mathematics 
25 th 22.72 34.09 22.72 
50 th 34.09 45.45 34.09 
Per cent change in instruction time Mean 36.83 44.65 36.54 
75 th 45.45 45.45 45.45 
Italian language 
25 th 19.48 19.48 19.48 
50 th 19.48 25.97 19.48 
Per cent change in instruction time Mean 22.64 26.96 21.55 
75 th 25.97 32.47 25.97 
Note: Presented are descriptive statistics for the measure of exposure to afternoon classes in math- 
ematics and Italian language for the three groups of schools. See Section 5.3 for details. 
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12 Given the lack of administrative data, no empirical evidence can be 
provided to support the adoption of such practice. However anecdotal ev- 
idence – also conﬁrmed by the Ministry of Education – suggests that this 
is the predominant rule rather than the exception. egressors considered (i.e. test scores and student charac-
eristics in the baseline year). 
. Methods 
.1. Identiﬁcation 
Selection of classes into PQM is modelled using sezione
xed effects. Schools can autonomously set the rules for
he assignment of teachers to sezione , but the principle of
nsuring that students maintain the same teacher over the
econdary education cycle (three years, from grade six to
rade eight) is strongly recommended by the Italian law.
eachers work in a highly regulated public sector, with vir-
ually no risk of termination, and are subject to a pay and
romotion structure that is largely independent of perfor-
ance. Teachers hired on a permanent contract – a re-
uirement to participate in PQM – are employed at school
8 h per week. As instruction time in mathematics is set
y law to 6 h per week in each grade of lower secondary
ducation, the practice that math teachers fulﬁl duties over
he three grades of the same sezione is widespread (the 6 hinclude 2 h devoted to science). This rule is also prompted
by a national reform on staff ratios that passed before
the beginning of PQM ( Decreto ministeriale number 37, 26
March 2009 ), stating that the number of math teachers em-
ployed at school must correspond to the number of sezione
activated. In this setting, controlling for sezione ﬁxed ef-
fects most likely controls for math teacher effects. 
As for Italian language, instruction time is set to 9 h
per week (one hour is devoted to history and geography).
This implies that two language teachers are usually as-
signed to the three grades of the same sezione . Indeed,
the above mentioned reform states that the head count
for language teachers is computed as 1.5 times the num-
ber of sezione activated. For practical matters, it is common
to rotate teachers across grades, thus limiting their mobil-
ity across sezione over time. 12 In this setting, sezione ﬁxed
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13 We performed various sensitivity checks ﬁnding that results are ro- 
bust to modiﬁcations of the speciﬁcation adopted. In particular, we es- 
timated quantile treatment effects relying on the change-in-changes ap- 
proach by Athey and Imbens (2006) controlling for covariates using a 
weighting procedure as presented in Meroni (2013) . Alternative esti- 
mation strategies yielded results similar to those presented below. Se- 
lected results of the change-in-changes are presented in Table A-4 of 
Appendix A. ffects ar guably model the com position of teachers of the
lass. 
The analysis is carried out using two cohorts of sixth
raders in 2009/10 and 2010/11. All outcomes are deﬁned
t the class level. We compare performance of students
nrolled in the same sezione before and after PQM. This
eﬁnes a standard difference-in-differences approach, with 
ezione ﬁxed effects. By controlling for sezione ﬁxed effects
e indirectly control for school ﬁxed effects, and thus for
ll sources of potential biases related to unobservable char-
cteristics of the class and the school. The causal parame-
ers retrieved refer to the effect of being in a PQM class. 
Two threats to the validity of the strategy discussed are
he possible direct effects of PQM on mobility of princi-
als (and teachers), as well as on sezione composition over
ime. We believe that the former should not be of con-
ern here, given the labour market of teachers and prin-
ipals in Italian public schools. The procedure required for
 transfer, combined with the main features of PQM de-
cribed above are arguably weak determinants of mobil-
ty. On the other hand, we checked if the introduction of
QM affected sezione com position. Results not presented
ere, and obtained using the same equations in the next
ection, rules out changes to class formation along key de-
ographics available in the data (gender, ethnicity, family
ackground and parental education). 
.2. Estimation 
Our analysis allows for cross subject effects (i.e. effect
f PQM mathematics on test scores in language, and vice
ersa ). Our preferred speciﬁcation considers the following
quation which is estimated by school subject: 
 jtk = α jk + βM k D M jt + β I k D I jt + δk N jt + ηtk +  jtk , (1) 
here y jtk is the outcome variable in sezione j , year t ( t = 1
nd t = 2 refer to the pre- and post-programme periods,
espectively) and school subject k (mathematics and Ital-
an language). D M 
jt 
and D I 
jt 
are dummies for being enrolled
n any activity in mathematics (M) and Italian language (I),
espectively, while N jt is dummy for control classes in PQM
chools. There is D I 
j1 
= D M 
j1 
= N j1 = 0 for all j ’s. With this
otation βM 
M 
and β I 
M 
measure the effect of receiving extra
ours in mathematics or language, respectively, on mathe-
atics scores. A similar interpretation applies to the effects
M 
I 
and β I 
I 
on language; ηtk captures time effects and αjk 
s the sezione ﬁxed effect, both subject speciﬁc, and  jtk is
 random error. 
Eq. (1) is then reﬁned by considering variability in
ength of afternoon activities. The following speciﬁcation is
onsidered: 
 jtk = α jk + βM k D M jt + λM k H M jt + β I k D I jt + λI k H I jt + δk N jt 
+ ηtk +  jtk , (2) 
here H M 
jt 
and H I 
jt 
represent intensity in mathematics and
anguage, respectively, as deviation from the mean. The
arametrisation adopted is such that the coeﬃcients βM 
k 
nd β I 
k 
in Eq. (2) can be read as the effect of PQM when
ntensity is set to its mean, which is about 50 h for bothubjects. As the length of afternoon activities is chosen by
eachers, for identiﬁcation we rely on sezione ﬁxed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered at the school level. As
 sensitivity check we clustered standard errors at the
ezione level, which is where treatment takes place. This
nalysis yields results which are informational equivalent
o those presented below. The conditioning on a set X jt of
tudent and school level variables is left implicit through-
ut, but is used in the empirical analysis. All regressions
resented control for class size, weekly class schedule and
lass level variables constructed from student level infor-
ation (e.g. gender, immigration status, whether the stu-
ent is ahead or behind compared to her age, education of
arents and mother working status, plus control for miss-
ng values). 
The analysis is carried out by considering three differ-
nt outcomes y jtk , all deﬁned at the class level. We start
y using average scores, for which results are presented in
able 6 . We then set y jtk to the percentage of students in
he class scoring above a certain threshold, which we make
ubject speciﬁc. Thresholds are deﬁned using baseline data,
alculating a grid from the 1 st to the 99 th percentile of the
elevant distribution. By considering this outcome variable,
e use within class variability in scores to study possible
eterogeneity in the effects of PQM. Results using this out-
ome are in Fig. 1 . Our approach closely resembles a non-
inear difference-in-differences method, that was originally
roposed by Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2009) and then
e-considered by Havnes and Mogstad (2010) . Our speciﬁ-
ation for dealing with quantiles proves particularly con-
enient to account for the availability of multiple control
roups, and to model treatment intensity represented by
ariability across PQM classes in the number of activities.
inally we use between class variability in scores to study
eterogeneity in the effects of PQM across classes. To this
nd, we consider an indicator for having the class aver-
ge score above a certain threshold, which again we make
ubject speciﬁc and deﬁned from percentiles calculated on
aseline data. The results from this analysis are presented
n Fig. 2 . 13 
. Results 
.1. Average effects 
Table 6 presents estimates of the effects obtained from
q. (1) for both mathematics and language, by tertiles of
chool performance in the pre-intervention year. The vari-
ble considered is average score in the class. The left hand
ide part of the table refers to mathematics, while the right
and side part refers to language. For both school subjects
e present the break down by cognitive domains covered
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Table 6 
Effect of PQM on mathematics and Italian language (participation vis-à-vis non-participation). 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Bottom Middle Top Bottom Middle Top 
tertile tertile tertile tertile tertile tertile 
Mathematics Italian language 
Any extra class in mathematics 0 .296 ∗∗∗ 0 .054 0 .030 0 .020 0 .061 0 .086 
(0 .112) (0 .092) (0 .088) (0 .094) (0 .071) (0 .097) 
Any extra class in language −0 .004 −0 .059 −0 .284 ∗∗ −0 .103 0 .050 −0 .021 
(0 .084) (0 .084) (0 .119) (0 .083) (0 .082) (0 .105) 
Control class in PQM schools 0 .015 0 .037 −0 .033 −0 .056 0 .017 −0 .063 
(0 .069) (0 .071) (0 .089) (0 .069) (0 .054) (0 .086) 
Mathematical reasoning Reading comprehension 
Any extra class in mathematics 0 .308 ∗∗∗ 0 .095 −0 .007 0 .0 0 0 0 .118 0 .029 
(0 .090) (0 .091) (0 .098) (0 .083) (0 .075) (0 .097) 
Any extra class in language −0 .012 −0 .040 −0 .217 ∗ −0 .086 0 .069 −0 .047 
(0 .080) (0 .088) (0 .119) (0 .074) (0 .076) (0 .107) 
Control class in PQM schools 0 .047 0 .010 −0 .008 −0 .085 0 .020 −0 .073 
(0 .067) (0 .080) (0 .088) (0 .062) (0 .058) (0 .081) 
Mathematical knowledge Grammar knowledge 
Any extra class in mathematics 0 .247 ∗∗ 0 .025 0 .059 0 .090 −0 .034 0 .089 
(0 .124) (0 .088) (0 .080) (0 .101) (0 .083) (0 .090) 
Any extra class in language −0 .005 −0 .071 −0 .302 ∗∗∗ −0 .054 0 .021 0 .011 
(0 .083) (0 .078) (0 .114) (0 .090) (0 .085) (0 .096) 
Control class in PQM schools −0 .027 0 .056 −0 .044 −0 .024 0 .010 −0 .081 
(0 .068) (0 .059) (0 .083) (0 .069) (0 .054) (0 .085) 
Observations 812 932 886 812 932 886 
Note: Difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of the intervention on mathematics and Italian language. The top panel 
refers to gains in mathematics – columns (1)–(3) – and Italian language – columns (4)–(6). Mathematics is decomposed into 
mathematical reasoning (central panel) and mathematical knowledge (bottom panel). Italian language is decomposed into read- 
ing comprehension (central panel) and grammar knowledge (bottom panel). Schools have been divided into three groups ac- 
cording to test scores in pre-treatment year as explained in Section 5.2 . Estimates are at the class level with sezione ﬁxed 
effects. Standard errors clustered at the school level in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01. 
 
f  
a  
h  
h  
d  
c  
m  
b  
n  
i  
k
 
t  
p  
T  
o  
b
d  
a  
t  
v  
i  
f  
t  
i
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V  
 The ﬁrst result worth noting is the absence of any ef-
ect of PQM on language, for both domains considered and
cross tertile groups– see columns (4)–(6). On the other
and, we ﬁnd that extra instruction time in mathematics
as large positive effects on mathematics, but only for stu-
ents in the most problematic schools (0.29 points) – see
olumn (1). This effect is driven by the “reasoning” do-
ain; the effect on the “knowledge” domain is positive,
ut less statistically signiﬁcant and of slightly smaller mag-
itude. 14 This ﬁnding suggests that extra instruction time
ncrease basic knowledge and helps students apply and use
nowledge acquired during normal school hours. 
We ﬁnd evidence of cross subject effects for schools in
he top tertile, since extra time dedicated to language im-
acts negatively on scores in mathematics– see column (3).
he size of this effect ( −0 . 28 points) is comparable to that
f extra activities in mathematics found for schools in the
ottom tertile, and it is mostly driven by the “knowledge”
omain. This result suggests that the extra time spent on
ctivities targeting Italian language substitutes the time
hat the students in best schools would have spent de-
eloping their mathematical knowledge, and this in turn
mpacts on scores. The general picture that emerges is in
avour of targeting the most problematic students with ex-
ra activities that help develop mathematics skills. More-14 A bootstrap test for the equality of results for knowledge and reason- 
ng fails to reject the null at the conventional levels. 
 
 
 over, we ﬁnd that test scores for control classes are the
same in schools with and without PQM – this is the coef-
ﬁcient on N jt in Eq. (1) . This rules out possible spill-over
effects that may arise, for example, if teachers of PQM
classes share with other colleagues at the school materi-
als and teaching modalities acquired during the prepara-
tory course. 
Finally, Table 7 replicates the same analysis by consid-
ering Eq. (2) . Results for the average effects are reported
in columns (1), (5) and (9). Coeﬃcients for participation
into any mathematics and Italian language activities con-
ﬁrm ﬁndings from Eq. (1) ; in addition it seems the length
of additional instruction time does not seem to play any
role, since the variation from the mean it is never signiﬁ-
cantly different from zero, with the exception of schools in
the top tertile which increase slightly test scores in Italian
if they receive more classes than the average in Italian and
math – column (9). 
Given the number of outcome variables considered,
we run the risk of over rejection of the null hypothesis
due to problem of multiple inference. To assess the ro-
bustness of our results to this problem, we implement
the procedure by Westfall and Young (1993) to adjust p -
alues. Their step-down permutation algorithm is applied
to the two main coeﬃcients in Table 6 by tertile (any ex-
tra class in mathematics and any extra class in language).
Considering the following scores: math, knowledge, rea-
soning, language, grammar and reading. As the procedure
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Fig. 1. Effects on quantiles of test scores (within class variability). Note: Effects of PQM within classes for test scores in mathematics (ﬁrst column) and 
Italian language (second column), together with 95% conﬁdence intervals. Point estimates were derived by estimating Eq. (1) , where the outcome variable is 
the percentage of students in the class with test score above the percentile reported on the horizontal axis. Percentiles were computed from pre-programme 
data. Conﬁdence intervals were obtained using a normal approximation, standard errors being clustered at the school level. See Section 6 for details. 
50 E. Battistin, E.C. Meroni / Economics of Education Review 55 (2016) 39–56 
Fig. 2. Effects on quantiles of test scores (between class variability). Note: Effects of PQM across classes for test scores in mathematics (ﬁrst column) and 
Italian language (second column), together with 95% conﬁdence intervals. Point estimates were derived by estimating Eq. (1) , where the outcome variable 
is a dummy for the class average score being above the percentile reported on the horizontal axis. Percentiles were computed from pre-programme data. 
Conﬁdence intervals were obtained using a normal approximation, standard errors being clustered at the school level. See Section 6 for details. 
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Table 7 
Effect of PQM on mathematics and Italian language (intensity). 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Bottom tertile Middle tertile Top tertile 
Average 25 th 50 th 75 th Average 25 th 50 th 75 th Average 25 th 50 th 75 th 
Panel A: Mathematics 
Any extra class 
mathematics 
0 .302 ∗∗ 0 .064 0 .127 ∗∗∗ 0 .129 ∗∗∗ 0 .054 0 .001 0 .001 0 .022 0 .046 0 .022 −0 .010 −0 .014 
(0 .119) (0 .045) (0 .046) (0 .042) (0 .088) (0 .032) (0 .045) (0 .035) (0 .091) (0 .024) (0 .043) (0 .043) 
Intensity mathematics −0 .001 −0 .002 −0 .0 0 0 0 .001 0 .0 0 0 0 .001 0 .002 −0 .0 0 0 0 .009 ∗ 0 .004 ∗∗∗ 0 .004 ∗ 0 .004 
(0 .006) (0 .003) (0 .003) (0 .002) (0 .004) (0 .002) (0 .002) (0 .002) (0 .005) (0 .001) (0 .002) (0 .003) 
Any extra class language −0 .015 0 .049 −0 .024 −0 .011 −0 .044 −0 .013 −0 .013 −0 .032 −0 .292 ∗∗ −0 .044 −0 .089 ∗ −0 .152 ∗∗∗
(0 .085) (0 .038) (0 .038) (0 .027) (0 .094) (0 .032) (0 .043) (0 .038) (0 .124) (0 .028) (0 .051) (0 .052) 
Intensity language −0 .006 −0 .001 −0 .001 −0 .003 −0 .007 −0 .002 −0 .003 −0 .002 0 .004 −0 .001 0 .005 −0 .002 
(0 .007) (0 .002) (0 .003) (0 .003) (0 .005) (0 .002) (0 .003) (0 .002) (0 .009) (0 .003) (0 .004) (0 .004) 
Control class in PQM 
school 
0 .016 −0 .005 0 .023 0 .0 0 0 0 .034 0 .039 0 .021 0 .004 −0 .033 0 .004 −0 .005 −0 .026 
(0 .069) (0 .030) (0 .030) (0 .022) (0 .071) (0 .026) (0 .033) (0 .028) (0 .089) (0 .021) (0 .034) (0 .036) 
Panel B: Italian language 
Any extra class 
mathematics 
0 .003 0 .009 0 .013 0 .003 0 .074 0 .016 0 .040 0 .058 ∗ 0 .105 0 .053 ∗∗ 0 .024 0 .013 
(0 .098) (0 .041) (0 .042) (0 .029) (0 .078) (0 .028) (0 .033) (0 .030) (0 .083) (0 .026) (0 .041) (0 .034) 
Intensity mathematics −0 .004 −0 .002 0 .001 −0 .0 0 0 −0 .004 ∗ −0 .001 −0 .004 ∗∗∗ −0 .001 0 .012 ∗∗∗ 0 .005 ∗∗∗ 0 .007 ∗∗∗ 0 .005 ∗∗∗
(0 .007) (0 .003) (0 .003) (0 .002) (0 .002) (0 .001) (0 .001) (0 .001) (0 .003) (0 .001) (0 .002) (0 .002) 
Any extra class language −0 .115 −0 .019 −0 .042 −0 .036 0 .042 0 .003 0 .025 0 .004 0 .036 0 .007 0 .027 0 .004 
(0 .082) (0 .033) (0 .033) (0 .025) (0 .085) (0 .030) (0 .040) (0 .031) (0 .086) (0 .027) (0 .043) (0 .039) 
Intensity language −0 .013 −0 .005 −0 .006 −0 .004 −0 .0 0 0 −0 .001 0 .001 0 .002 0 .027 ∗∗∗ 0 .008 ∗∗∗ 0 .012 ∗∗ 0 .008 ∗∗
(0 .009) (0 .003) (0 .004) (0 .003) (0 .006) (0 .003) (0 .002) (0 .002) (0 .006) (0 .002) (0 .005) (0 .003) 
Control class in PQM 
school 
−0 .054 −0 .016 −0 .025 −0 .010 0 .019 0 .023 0 .010 −0 .030 ∗ −0 .070 −0 .019 −0 .051 −0 .025 
(0 .068) (0 .027) (0 .029) (0 .020) (0 .054) (0 .024) (0 .023) (0 .018) (0 .084) (0 .026) (0 .036) (0 .033) 
Observations 806 806 806 806 920 920 920 920 880 880 880 880 
Note: Difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of the intensity of the intervention on mathematics and Italian language. Estimates are at the class 
level with sezione ﬁxed effects. Standard errors clustered at the school level in parentheses. For 6 classes enrolled in PQM mathematics and 6 classes 
enrolled in PQM Italian language we do not have information about the number of activities taken during the afternoon; thus those classes are not used 
in computations. ∗p < 0.10; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01. 
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15 Additional assumptions (e.g., rank invariance) are required to inter- 
pret our results as student-level or class-level treatment effects. y Westfall and Young (1993) is often considered too con-
ervative, we also check the sensitivity of conclusions using
wo alternative methods. First, we obtain p -Values from a
on-parametric permutation test ( Anderson, 2008; Efron &
ibshirani, 1993 ). Second, we compute false discovery rate
FDR) adjusted p -Values, as presented in Anderson (2008) .
he adjusted p -Values substantially conﬁrm the results ob-
ained in Table 6 (see Table A-5). 
.2. Quantile effects 
We start by deﬁning a grid that ranges between the
 st and the 99 th percentiles of the distribution of scores
n the baseline period, for mathematics and language. We
hen consider the fraction of students in the class whose
core is above each percentile. This deﬁnes 99 variables,
hich we employed as outcomes in Eq. (1) . Fig. 1 provides
 graphical summary of estimation results (dashed lines
efer to 95% conﬁdence intervals). Graphs on the left hand
ide report the effect of PQM-mathematics on the fraction
f students with a math score above each percentile. Sim-
larly, graphs on the right hand side report the effect of
QM-language on the fraction of students with a language
core above each percentile. The top, central and bottom
anels of the ﬁgure refer to schools in the bottom, medium
nd top tertile of pre-intervention scores, respectively. The
iscussion on cross-subject effects is deferred to Fig. 3 . 
Consistently with the ﬁrst row of Table 6 , results in
ig. 1 are signiﬁcant only for mathematics in the most dis-
dvantaged schools. In these environments PQM increased nequality within the class: high math scores (i.e. scores
bove the median) are more likely, but the occurrence of
ow scores is not affected by the intervention. This ef-
ect on the distribution of math scores boosts average per-
ormance of the class in the most disadvantaged schools,
hich explains the effect in column (1) of Table 1 . How-
ver, Fig. 2 shows that not all classes have the same shift
n average performance. The ﬁgure is constructed as Fig. 1 ,
ut here the outcome in Eq. (1) is a dummy that takes
alue one when the average score in the class is above
ach percentile. In other words, Fig. 1 considers within
lass variability whereas Fig. 2 looks at between class vari-
bility. In the most disadvantaged schools, the bottom 40%
f the score distributions in PQM and non-PQM classes co-
ncide. In results non-presented, we ﬁnd that a similar pic-
ure emerges for mathematical reasoning. These ﬁndings
re consistent with the idea that PQM has had no effect
n the worst learning environments. 15 
Fig. 3 reports the same quantile analysis for the ef-
ects of PQM-language on math scores considering schools
n the top tertile. This is the only cross subject effect for
hich we ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant results in column (3)
f Table 6 . The graph on the left hand side of is obtained
s Fig. 1 ; the graph on the right hand side instead repli-
ates the analysis in Fig. 2 . We ﬁnd that the negative effect
ocumented in the Table 6 is substantially stable across
52 E. Battistin, E.C. Meroni / Economics of Education Review 55 (2016) 39–56 
Fig. 3. Effects of Italian language extra instruction time on quantiles of mathematics test scores (between and within class variability). Note: Effects of PQM 
Italian language within (left hand side panel) and between (right hand side panel) classes for test scores in mathematics, together with 95% conﬁdence 
intervals, for schools in the top tertile. Point estimates were derived by estimating Eq. (1) as explained in the text. Conﬁdence intervals were obtained 
using a normal approximation, standard errors being clustered at the school level. See Section 6 for details. 
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16 In 2008/09 participation was based on voluntary bases. Neverthe- 
less a random sample of schools – about 25% of schools in the popula- 
tion – was mandated to participate and test scores were administered in 
presence of an external monitor. We only use this sample of schools for 
2008/09. lasses, although it is very imprecisely measured. Such ef-
ect appears to be driven by negative effects at the high-
st quantiles of the score distribution within the class. This
nding is consistent with the idea that the extra activities
argeting mastery of Italian language result in lower per-
ormance in mathematics for the best students. 
Columns (2)–(4), (6)–(8) and (10)–(12) of Table 7 repli-
ate the within class analysis by considering our measure
f treatment intensity exposure. Only results for selected
ercentiles ( 25 th , 50 th and 75 th ) are presented. As for the
ffects on mathematics test scores – panel A – for schools
n the bottom tertile, the general pattern in Fig. 1 is con-
rmed, with larger effects documented in top quantiles –
olumns (3) and (4). Similarly, for schools in middle ter-
ile we ﬁnd no effects. For schools in the top tertile we
nd that the duration of afternoon activities plays some
ole at the bottom end of the distribution (see results for
he bottom 25 and 50% – columns (10) and (11)). Also con-
rmed are the negative cross subject effects of activities in
talian language on mathematics test scores, which are in-
reasing in size as one moves to the highest percentiles of
he distribution (columns (11) and (12)). We seem to ﬁnd
vidence that longer hours spent on individualised instruc-
ion become important only if we consider students from
he best performing schools. We also ﬁnd some effects on
he Italian language test score (panel B): in particular for
chools in the top tertile who receive more classes than
he average in Italian language and mathematics. And for
chool in the middle tertile we ﬁnd a negative cross sub-
ect effects of receiving more classes in mathematics on
talian language. 
. Robustness checks 
The aim of this section is twofold. First, we then discuss
he plausibility of the common trend assumption for PQM
nd control schools in pre-intervention periods. Since tests
cores from the national assessment are available in Italyfor sixth graders only from 2009/10, we proxy counter-
factual scores by considering ﬁfth graders, for whom data
are available since 2008/09. Second, we provide a test for
the validity of sezione ﬁxed effects as proxy for unobserved
class differences in our analysis. 
8.1. Speciﬁcation test using test scores for ﬁfth graders 
The assumption needed for our identiﬁcation strategy
to work is that, in the absence of PQM, scores in all
classes would have presented parallel trends. Scores for
sixth graders are available at the national level starting
from the year 2009/10. This makes it impossible to test for
the existence of pre-intervention trends in the outcomes
of interest using only our working sample. For this rea-
son, we use scores for ﬁfth graders that are available at the
national level from 2008/09, thus adding one year of pre-
intervention data. 16 The key assumption is that the trend
in scores for ﬁfth graders in the years before PQM pro-
vides a good approximation to the trend for sixth graders.
This assumption is rather innocuous in the Italian context,
given that the transition from the primary (ﬁfth grade) to
the lower secondary (sixth grade) school is characterised
by extremely low geographic mobility. Students typically
enrol at both levels in schools in the same local area, which
in the large majority of cases are only a few kilometres
apart or are located in adjacent buildings. This means that
many of the students who complete primary education in
June, end up enrolled in sixth grade at the same school in
September. 
We therefore selected ﬁfth graders enrolled in primary
schools of areas where PQM was implemented, and used
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Fig. 4. Speciﬁcation test using data for ﬁfth graders (mathematics). 
Note: The analysis uses all municipalities with at least one lower secondary school. We consider 955 municipalities for the years 2009/10 and 2010/11 917 
(112 of which have at least one PQM school), and 135 municipalities for the year 2008/09 (30 with at least one PQM school). 
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o  his group to proxy pre-programme trends from 2008/09.
s the sixth grade is the ﬁrst year at lower secondary
chool, we need to establish a link between PQM schools
n our sample and primary schools of Objective 1 areas. We
roceed according to the following steps. First, we deﬁne
 dummy “PQM municipality” depending on number of 
ower secondary schools enrolled in PQM. We consider four
lternative deﬁnitions as a sensitivity check for our conclu-
ions. The ﬁrst deﬁnition imposes that a PQM municipal-
ty must have all lower secondary schools enrolled in PQM
rom 2010/11. Clearly, this deﬁnition may be too restrictive
s – for example – larger municipalities are most likely 
xcluded because they have a larger number of schools.
he alternative deﬁnitions are less restrictive, and impose
hat PQM municipalities must have at least 20 and 50%
f lower secondary schools enrolled in PQM from 2010/11.
he last deﬁnition that we employ is the least restrictive,
nd labels PQM municipalities as those where at least one
chool is involved in PQM from 2010/11. Second, we col-
apse data at the municipality level, and compute average
est scores for students enrolled in ﬁfth grade at primary
chool. We then compare the time series of test scores for
fth graders in PQM municipalities to that of ﬁfth graders
n non-PQM municipalities, for years 20 08/09, 20 09/10 and
010/11. Fig. 4 presents the times series of ﬁfth graders
or the four deﬁnitions of PQM municipality adopted. Weresent results only for math scores, as the analysis yielded
imilar conclusions for language. Regardless of the deﬁni-
ion adopted, the time series for ﬁfth graders present re-
arkably similar trends over time, thus corroborating the
ssumption needed for identiﬁcation. Under the assump-
ions stated, we can conclude that sixth grade students in
QM areas have competencies at entrance that are simi-
ar to those of students in other municipalities that in the
ain analysis are used as controls. 
.2. Class vis- `a -vis sezione clustering of students 
We start by estimating a model in which the variance
f test scores across students is explained by two lev-
ls: school and class. In this estimation we consider all
chools located in the four Objective 1 regions, excluding
QM schools. We ﬁnd that, for both subjects, the fraction
f variance explained by each level is roughly constant in
009/10 and 2010/11. We thus pool the two waves of data,
nd report in Panel A of Table 8 results from the mul-
ilevel analysis. Class membership is twice as much im-
ortant than school membership in explaining variability
f mathematics scores (21% as opposed to 11%), while it
s less for language scores. We also report results of the
ame analysis obtained using sezione membership instead
f class membership. Since the same sezione appears both
54 E. Battistin, E.C. Meroni / Economics of Education Review 55 (2016) 39–56 
Table 8 
Robustness checks (variability of test scores explained by sezione ). 
A : % of variance explained by school, sezione and class (pooled 2009/10 and 2010/11 data) 
School Class Residual 
Mathematics 0.113 0.208 0.696 
Italian Language 0.104 0.143 0.758 
School Sezione Residual 
Mathematics 0.105 0.123 0.783 
Italian Language 0.099 0.087 0.815 
B : Serial correlation of variables in the same sezione across years 
Null model School FE School FE + controls 
Test score mathematics 0.419 ∗∗∗ 0.265 ∗∗∗ 0.230 ∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.014) (0.014) 
Test score language 0.478 ∗∗∗ 0.282 ∗∗∗ 0.223 ∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.014) (0.014) 
Home possession coeﬃcient 0.327 ∗∗∗ 0.150 ∗∗∗ 0.088 ∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.014) (0.014) 
% of foreign students 0.263 ∗∗∗ 0.151 ∗∗∗ 0.136 ∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.014) (0.014) 
Note: Panel A. Multilevel model that makes use of school and class membership (ﬁrst row), and school and 
sezione membership (second row); all sixth graders in the four PON regions are considered, excluding PQM 
schools. Panel B. Regression of variables at time 2 (2010/11) on variable at time 1 (2009/10) in the same sezione 
(null model); including school ﬁxed effects (FE); and adding controls – see Section 8.2 for details. ∗p < 0.10; 
∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01. 
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 n 2009/10 and 2010/11, this analysis attempts at explain-
ng the same variance using roughly half the number of
roups. We ﬁnd that the fraction of variance explained by
chool membership is roughly comparable to the previous
gures, and that sezione explains 12 / 21 = 57 (for mathe-
atics) and 9 / 14 = 64 (for language) per cent of the vari-
nce that was explained using class membership. We con-
lude that the contribution to the variance coming from
lass membership is mostly spanned by that coming from
ezione membership. 
We complement this analysis by regressing average test
cores in 2010/11 on average test scores in 2009/10 for
he same sezione . Three nested speciﬁcations are consid-
red for the regressions reported in Panel B of Table 8 .
he ﬁrst speciﬁcation obtains results from a null model;
he second controls for school ﬁxed effects; the third adds
ontrols (percentage of females, class size, percentage of
oreign students). The following outcomes are considered:
est scores (to proxy persistence of students’ and teach-
rs’ ability), and the home possession index and the per-
entage of foreign students in the class (to proxy assign-
ent based on socio-economic status). Results show that
he persistence in the characteristics of the sezione can-
ot be fully explained by school ﬁxed effects or observable
ariables. 
. Conclusions 
This paper has provided evidence on the effect of man-
ating students from low achieving schools in Southern
taly to afternoon activities in mathematics and Italian lan-
uage. We have investigated the effects of the Quality and
erit Project (PQM), implemented in Objective 1 regions
hrough EU Regional Development Funds and EU Social
unds. We have found that increasing time spent at school
s important only in the most problematic learning envi-ronments. In our setting, these are represented by schools
in the bottom tertile of the distribution of performance in
the pre-PQM period. 
We have found that only scores in mathematics are
affected, and estimated a positive effect of about 0.296
points of standard deviation. In line with the objectives
of the intervention, we have shown that this result fol-
lows from an improvement in quantitative reasoning and
in mathematical knowledge . This result is consistent with
other studies in the literature showing that it is much
harder to intervene on reading and comprehension skills,
rather than on skills involving practice, like maths, be-
cause a large part of literacy work takes place through gen-
eral vocabulary training in the home environment ( Jensen,
2013; Marcotte, 2007; Sims, 2008; Zimmer et al., 2010 ).
Research in developmental psychology has suggested that
the critical period for language development occurs early
in life, while the critical period for developing higher
cognitive functions extends into adolescence, thus as it
is documented in previous works that considers the im-
pact of early interventions on children outcomes, in or-
der to affect reading skills and language test scores we
should target younger children, during elementary or pre-
schools. 
We have concluded that the ﬁrst order effects of be-
ing assigned to individualised activities are more impor-
tant than those arising from the duration of these activi-
ties. We also have found that the positive effect of PQM in
the most critical schools conceals a good deal of variability
within the class. We have shown that the effect is driven
by a large, positive shift to the distribution of test scores,
but that a sizeable group at the bottom end of the distri-
bution is left unaffected by the intervention. As in other
studies that have investigated similar interventions – see,
for example, Lavy and Schlosser (2005) and Banerjee et al.
(2007) – we have found that only the least advantaged stu-
dents are those with positive returns to participation. 
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S  Our results imply that EU Regional Development Funds
nd EU Social Funds used to roll out education policies
n the most deprived areas must tailor effective strate-
ies around the students most in need to avoid important
eadweight loss. 
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